recent illegal search and seizure cases 2019 recent illegal search and seizure cases 2019

Over several days, police officers observed Mr. Gordon selling heroin from his home; in addition to the surveillance, undercover officers engaged in drug transactions with Mr. Gordon and conducted a controlled buy using an informant. One man, mature FBI agent working on a case in dark office. In Ross, the Supreme Court held that when police officers have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk of a vehiclebased on an informant's tip that narcotics were being kept in the trunk of the carthe police may open a paper bag found inside the trunk (Ross, 456 US at 801). Additionally no observation was reported as to any movement of persons between the house and the van. By Jason S. Cherry, J.D. In the context of Article 1, Section 12, we have done so when, among other considerations, "the aims of predictability and precision in judicial review of search and seizure cases . . Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the factual allegations did not support a search of the vehicles located outside the residence. To further that role, our constitution assigns to the magistrate the tasks of evaluating whether probable cause exists to initiate a search and defining the subjects to be searched (see Nieves, 36 NY2d at 402 ["In reviewing the validity of a search warrant to determine whether it was supported by probable cause or whether it contained a sufficiently particular description of its target, the critical facts and circumstances for the reviewing court are those which were made known to the issuing Magistrate at the time the warrant application was determined"]). The Supreme Court did not address whether a search of an automobile could be upheld when the information supporting a warrant application is determined by a magistrate to justify the search of a premises but makes no mention of vehicles located on the property. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. THE STATE v. ROSENBAUM et al. For example, "a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found" (Ross, 456 US at 821). The only reference to the New York Constitution in those decisions comes in the form of a parallel reference or citation to New York Constitution article I, 12 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (see Sciacca, 45 NY2d at 127; Hansen, 38 NY2d at 22; Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299; People v Rainey, 14 NY2d 35, 38 [1964]). The issue in Hansen was whether there was probable cause for the search warrant directed at "two separate target locations discretely described," namely a residence and an "automotive van wherever located" (id. "Listen to this mother, who lost two children to fentanyl poisoning, tell the truth about . G.R. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action'"]). The People rely heavily on United States v Ross (456 US 798 [1982]) and several decisions of Federal Courts of Appeals that have determined, under the U.S. Constitution, that a warrant to search an "entire premises" may, under certain circumstances, impliedly authorize a search of automobiles found on the property (e.g. Indeed, we observed in Dumper thatpursuant to both constitutional and statutory directivesa "warrant must describe the premises to be searched" and "this warrant did not include the automobile" (Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299). Although a defendant must preserve a state constitutional analysis, Mr. Gordon has maintained throughout this litigation that the holdings of our jurisprudence should not follow the federal appellate extensions of United States v Ross, and that the rationale and considerations that undergird our jurisprudence counsel against adopting any extension of Ross that might displace them. Supreme Court granted suppression, on constraint of People v Sciacca (45 NY2d 122 [1978]), and the Appellate Division affirmed on the determinative ground that the "search warrant did not particularize that a search of the vehicles was permitted" (169 AD3d 714, 714-715 [2d Dept 2019]). In this area of constitutional law, we have set forth principles that would be unduly weakened by the People's preferred rule (see People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 407 [1985]). Supreme Court granted Mr. Gordon's motion to suppress. A search of the Chevrolet revealed a loaded handgun. As a repeat offender, a Passaic County judge sentenced him to consecutive prison terms totaling 25 years, and at. To satisfy the constitutional requirement for particularity, the description setting forth the search must "leave no discretion to the executing officer[s]" (Brown, 96 NY2d at 84). It is the majority's treatment of the state constitutional issue that is most problematic. . Biden then recalled the outspoken Georgia Republican's recent allegations regarding fentanyl deaths. Likewise, the People attempt to distinguish People v Dumper by arguing that the salient difference in Dumper was that the vehicle was driven onto the property during the execution of the warrant. at 21). While the majority characterizes these cases as setting forth state constitutional lawsimply by retroactively decreeing them to do so (majority op at 19)it is not clear if the majority intends these cases to stand for our contrary interpretation of the Federal Constitution, to form some kind of common-law rule, to be an implied application of the Criminal Procedure Law, or to express a heightened state constitutional standard. The application contained no mention of the existence of the vehicles ultimately searched, much less evidence connecting them to any criminality. In the Supreme Court of Georgia Decided: March 11, 2019 S18A1090. It's a fact that check cashing businesses handle a lot of cash and with a lot of cash comes a lot of reporting. Mr. Gordon based his argument on several of our prior decisions, including People v Dumper (28 NY2d 296 [1971]) and People v Hansen (38 NY2d 17 [1975], abrogated on other grounds by People v Ponder, 54 NY2d 160 [1981] [abrogating automatic standing]). I disagree. This applies when a person has what is known as a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or thing to be searched. Video, Inc., 68 NY2d 296, 304 [1986], quoting People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 406-407 [1985]). So important is the role of the neutral and detached magistrate that we have in the past parted ways from federal constitutional jurisprudence when we believed that an emerging rule of federal constitutional law "dilute[s] . at 821). The People's contention that a search warrant authorizing the search of a premises encompasses an implicit grant of [*5]authority to search all vehicles located on the property undermines the legislature's delineation of three distinct categories as appropriate subjects of a search (see Matter of Orens v Novello, 99 NY2d 180, 187 [2002] ["When different terms are used in various parts of a statute or rule, it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between them is intended"], quoting Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526, 530 [1975]; Rangolan v County of Nassau, 96 NY2d 42, 47 [2001] ["where . Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. You can explore additional available newsletters here. 690) and decisional law"]). . Here, there is no dispute that the search warrant was supported by probable cause to believe that defendant was involved in narcotics trafficking on his premises, and, unlike the vehicle in Dumper, defendant's vehicles were parked on the premises when the police arrived to execute the warrant. New York v Class, 475 US 106, 109 [1986] [New York Court of Appeals opinion failed to satisfy the plain-statement rule where it mentioned the New York Constitution "but once, and then only in direct conjunction with the United States Constitution," and made "use of both federal and New York cases in its analysis, generally citing both for the same proposition"]; New York v P.J. A team from the Justice Department conducted a 13-hour search of the presidents Wilmington residence on Friday. Although this Court has, starting in the 1980s, adopted "independent standards" under the State Constitution,[FN10] we have also continued to stress that the history of article I, 12 of the New York Constitution "supports the presumption" that the provision against unlawful searches and seizures conforms with that found in the Fourth Amendment (People v P.J. Thus, to be valid, a search warrant must be "specific enough to leave no discretion to the executing officer" (People v Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 84 [2001], quoting People v Darling, 95 NY2d 530, 537 [2000]). However, we held that the police lacked sufficient evidence to search a vehicle that had been seen coming and going from the residence. The Appellate Division affirmed, concurring in Supreme Court's conclusion that "the search warrant did not particularize that a search of the vehicles was permitted" and "probable cause to search those vehicles had not been established in the application for the search warrant" (169 AD3d 714, 714-715 [2d Dept 2019] [internal citations omitted]). This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. The determinative question on appeal is whether a valid warrant, supported by probable cause and authorizing the search of the "entire premises," permits the search of vehicles parked on the designated premises, when the vehicles may contain the items authorized to be seized by the warrant, but the warrant does not specifically mention the vehicles. The purpose of this site is to provide information from and about the Judicial Branch of the U.S. Government. This site is maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary. The Fourth Amendment provides important constitutional limits on abusive policing. We then concluded that even if the affidavit had been sufficient to support a search of the residence, the warrant failed "in any event [to] justify a search of the automobile which had just been driven into the driveway" (id. Two cases recently argued before SCOTUS could narrow or expand warrantless searches - and they could reach back to what police are doing now Feb 2, 2018 2018 started off with a double-feature in the U.S. Supreme Court starring the Fourth Amendment and police authority to search and seize. Individuals do not cede legitimate expectations of privacy when they park a vehicle at the house of a friend, acquaintance or stranger. The garage had a structural and functional existence distinct from defendant's van which should have been recognized by the investigators" (id. Indeed, a parallel citation indicates a belief by the litigant (or the court) that the state and federal provisions at issue are coextensive. at 299). Siegal represents John Drago who owned and operated a check cashing business, Kayla Companies. at 21 [emphasis added]). In People v Rainey, police officers tendered factual allegations sufficient to establish that the defendant's residence likely contained forged or illicit goods. Feuerstein askedMagistrate Judge Anne Y. Federal authorities believed that Drago's business was not paying itsfair share of taxes payments that were insufficient and documentation that was incomplete. Our Court has never adopted a "fixed analytical formula for determining when the proper protection of fundamental rights requires resort to the State Constitution" (Scott, 79 NY2d at 491). . the critical facts and circumstances for the reviewing court are those which were made known to the issuing Magistrate at the time the warrant application was determined"]). We cannot accept the argument that the entry into the private garage was a permissible incident of the right to search pursuant to a warrant. Citing Hansen and Dumper, we stated: "It is clear that a warrant to search a building does not include authority to search vehicles at the premises (People v Hansen, 38 NY2d 17; People v Dumper, 28 NY2d 296). . Both conclusions fundamentally alter our jurisprudence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. JAIME SISON, LEONARDO YANSON, AND ROSALIE BAUTISTA, Accused. Our decision in Dumper rested on two grounds. In Hansen, the police surveilled the van in question, recorded its repeated travels to and from the residence, and specifically mentioned the vehicle in the warrant. Siegal, now atMintz, Levin,Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, has won an argument in another case where the FBI got a bit over its skis in a search. Failing to do so, we accomplish the reverse. Video, Inc., 475 US 868, 872 n 4 [1986] [same, where the opinion "cited the New York Constitution only once, near the beginning of its opinion, and in the same parenthetical also cited the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution"]). Nevertheless, the majority insists that vehicles are special containers, arbitrarily favoring vehicles over other transportable containers, such as backpacks and rollable luggage, and containers normally located outdoors, such as mailboxes. Siegal's argument was that such a search was a violation of 4th Amendment rights and submitted a motion toUS District Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein that any evidence gathered in the raid shouldbe suppressed. Cases involving violations of basic rights of citizensin order to achieve a criminal enforcement action is simply wrong. Our prior decisional law and the CPL's differentiation between premises, vehicles, and persons both support the view that specific descriptions or designations, backed by particularized probable cause, are required for a search of each. The majority's response to the analysis of Ross conducted by all the federal circuit courts and other state courts that have considered the issue is to express "skeptic[ism]," with an added footnote that explains that the Supreme Court in Ross did not disturb the fundamental principle that searches must be bound by probable cause (majority op at 6 and n 1).